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Despite the risks, people enjoy giving advice. One explanation is that giving beneficial advice can result in reflected glory, ego boosts or reputation
enhancement. However, giving poor advice can be socially harmful (being perceived as incompetent or untrustworthy). In both circumstances, we have a
vested interest in the advice followers success or failure, especially when it reflects specifically on us compared with when it is diffused between
multiple advisors. We examined these dynamics using an Advisor-Advisee Game, where subjects acted as an Advisor to a confederate Advisee who
selected one of the three options when trying to win money: accept the subjects advice, accept the advice of a second confederate Advisor or accept
both Advisors advice. Results showed that having ones advice accepted, compared with being rejected, resulted in activity in the ventral striatuma
core reward area. Furthermore, the ventral striatum was only active when the subjects advice led to the advisee winning, and not when the advisee won
based on the confederates advice. Finally, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was more active when the Advisee won or lost money based solely on the
subjects advice compared with when the second Advisors advice was accepted. One explanation for these findings is that the MPFC monitors self-
relevant social information, while the ventral striatum is active when others accept advice and when their success leads to reflected glory.
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INTRODUCTION
Advice giving is described as an interaction between an advisor and
advisee in which the advisor attempts to aid the advisee to find an
answer for their problem (Lippitt, 1959). Giving advice, however, can
be a risky social and vocational endeavour. Research confirms that
people prefer to relay positive information to others (Rosen and
Tesser, 1970) and that people weigh their advice more carefully when
it reflects on them directly rather than through the medium of a third
party (Jonas et al., 2005). Furthermore, advice giving may be one at-
tempt to manipulate what others think about us (i.e. reputation seeking;
Izuma, 2012). If our advice is accepted, we may feel that we have gar-
nered another’s respect and admiration. If the advice provided leads to
another’s personal success, we may feel a sense of reward through ego
enhancement or reflected glory (Ortony et al., 1990; Cialdina et al.,
1976). Conversely, giving the wrong advice can lead to self-conscious
emotions (e.g. guilt or embarrassment) often associated with doing
interpersonal harm (e.g. helping others fail) and a feeling that others
may perceive us as incompetent, untrustworthy or spiteful.
Advice giving may be one way in which individuals can gain the
most basic of social rewards: acceptance and respect (Baumeister and
Leary, 1995). The hedonic feelings associated with giving advice are
presumably modulated by brain regions involved in primary reward
processes. For example, the dopamine-enriched striatum is a key area
activated during the receipt of a reward (Delgado, 2007; Hare et al.,
2008; Mobbs et al., 2009a,b), social cost-benefit analysis (Izuma, 2012)
and complex social interactions including reciprocity and trust build-
ing (King-Casas et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2010). Furthermore, the stri-
atum has been shown to respond when others like us (Davey et al.,
2009) and when perceiving one’s own good reputation (Izuma, 2008)
or social status (Ly et al., 2011), while activity in the striatum is
observed when people perform acts that enhance their reputation
including giving to charity (Harbaugh et al., 2007), egalitarianism
(Dawes et al., 2012) and social co-operation (Rilling et al., 2002).
Although the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is active during reward
states (O’Doherty, 2004), it is also active during tasks that evoke self-
relatedness (Mitchell et al., 2006), including when we deploy self-
monitoring (Moran et al., 2009), self-judgements (Kelley et al., 2002),
self-esteem (Somerville et al., 2010), and self-reflection (Johnson et al.,
2006). The MPFC is also active for self-relatedness in exchanges with
others, for example, when we observe similar others win money
(Mobbs et al., 2009a,b), and during impression management or reputa-
tion processing (Izuma et al., 2010). It has been suggested that processing
one’s own reputation requires meta-cognition and the MPFC is a prime
candidate for such an operation (Izuma, 2012). Indeed, the MPFC may
represent future beliefs about how others will negatively perceive us (e.g.
social distress and social transgressions; Eisenberger et al., 2007). If this is
true, then the MPFC should be active in self-relevant situations such as
when advisors experience an advisees’ positive or negative outcome based
on our right or wrong advice.
We created an Advisor-Advisee Game to test the hypothesis that
activation in the brain’s social reward circuitry will be increased
when people accept one’s advice. Specifically, we posited that obser-
ving an Advisee win will be more rewarding if it is based on one’s own
advice (i.e. Advisor A) compared with another’s advice (i.e. Advisor B).
We further reasoned that the brain regions that underlie the processing
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of self-relevance and reputation would be more active when one gives
good advice as a single agent, rather than as a member of a team with
distributed responsibility for the good advice. For example, having our
advice accepted, which then leads on to an Advisee winning, should
result in an increase in the brain’s reward (ventral striatum) and
self-monitoring (MPFC) regions when the win and loss are based
solely on the subject’s (i.e. Advisor A’s) advice compared with when
an Advisee accepts the same advice from two Advisors [i.e. the subject
(Advisor A) plus Advisor B (a confederate)].
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-three subjects were scanned in this experiment. Seven subjects
were omitted due to doubts over the veracity of the task manipulations,
leaving with 16 subjects (8 men, age 24.8 4.53). All were right handed,
fluent speakers of English and screened for psychiatric or neurological
problems. All subjects gave informed consent and were remunerated
£20 for time, travel and inconvenience. This study was authorized by
the Local Research Ethics Committee for Cambridge, UK.
Task
At the start of each experiment, each subject (Advisor A) was briefly
introduced to two confederates, the Advisee and the second Advisor
(Advisor B), and told that they were going to play a simple trust game
where the Advisee had to learn which Advisor was providing the best
information. Together with the two confederates, subjects were informed
that for each of a series of trials they were to provide the best advice to
the Advisee about which of the two boxes to choose in order to win £5
(Figure 1). In actuality, all responses by the Advisee and Advisor B were
pre-programmed. Once the subject (Advisor A) was separated from the
two confederates, it was explained that, while they would be given in-
formation about which box is most likely to win, Advisor B would not be
given any such information and therefore would be guessing about the
winning boxes. This step in the experimental rationale provided to the
subject was important for two reasons. First, unless one advisor was
clearly giving better advice then it would have been too difficult for
the Advisee to learn to trust one advisor over another as there would
have been no discriminating information. Second, if the subject thought
that Advisor B had been given the same information as the subject/
Advisor A, then we would have to justify why Advisor B was not sug-
gesting the same boxes for selection by the Advisee.
After giving advice, subjects were told that they would be informed
about all the advised information put forward, as well as the selection
made by the Advisee. In other words, participants were informed as to
whether the Advisee accepted their advice despite conflicting advice
being provided by Advisor B, rejected their advice in favour of con-
flicting advice from Advisor B or accepted the advice provided by both
Advisors when the Advisors were in agreement. Following the accept-
ance or rejection of advice, the subject passively observed which of the
two boxes led to the Advisee winning or losing £5.
We indicated that if we had not given the subject this privileged
information such that both advisors were essentially guessing about the
advice to give, then the task for the Advisee would have been impos-
sibly hard as there would have been no discriminating information.
The task was nevertheless a challenge for the Advisee, however, as the
Fig. 1 Trial sequence and timing of the Advisor-Advisee Game. The subject (Advisor A), but not the Advisee or Advisor B (both confederates), was initially presented with two boxes on the screen. Each box
showed the probability of that box winning if it was later selected. The subject was told that when these probability percentages were replaced with question marks, both the Advisee and Advisor B could now
also see the boxes. The subject then gave advice by pressing a left or right button to signal to the Advisee which box was the most likely one to win. Following this, the subject was told that the Advisee could
either accept their advice, reject their advice or accept both the subject’s and Advisor B’s advice. After a jittered ITI, the outcome of whether the Advisee won or lost was revealed to the subject. Finally, to
ensure the subject was paying attention, she/he had to indicate the win or lose outcome of the Advisee.
1324 SCAN (2015) D.Mobbs et al.
other advisor (Advisor B) would still, even by chance, be giving the
correct advice on around 50% of trials and so it would not be surpris-
ing that the Advisee did not immediately latch onto the fact that the
subject was providing the most useful information. To further reduce
the likelihood of suspicion, we made sure that it was clear to partici-
pants that their advice was infallible. For example, it is important to
point out that the advice was not likely to have been perceived as
infallible because participants were not being told that this box will
definitely win when provided with the insider information. Rather,
they were being given a probability (on some trials as low as 60 : 40)
of that box being more likely to win and this formed the basis of
the advice that they were passing on. For each trial, there was therefore
a 10–40% likelihood that their advice would turn out to be wrong
based on the probabilities that they had been shown beforehand.
Consequently, in order to become suspicious on these grounds, they
would need to track not only the percentage of times that their advice
was incorrect but also to relate it to these varying probabilities. We felt
that this was unlikely but, nevertheless, we took care to exclude the
data from participants where suspicion was reported.
At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire
asking them to indicate on a 10-point Likert scale with 1¼ not at all
and 10¼ very much: (Q1) ‘How rewarding did you find it, when the
advisee lost after not taking your advice?’; (Q2) ‘How upsetting was it for
you when the advisee rejected your advice?’’ (Q3) ‘How rewarding was it
for you when you gave the advisee the right advice and they won?’; (Q4)
‘How responsible did you feel when the advisee won after giving them
the right advice?’ and (Q5) ‘Do you like to give people advice?’
Image acquisition
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanning was conducted at the
Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit on a
3-T Tim Trio Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner (Siemens,
Germany) by using a head coil gradient set. Whole-brain data were
acquired with echo planar T2*-weighted imaging (EPI), sensitive to
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal contrast (48 sagit-
tal slices, 3 mm thickness; repetition time (TR)¼ 2400 ms, echo time
(TE)¼ 25 ms, flip angle¼ 908, field of view (FOV)¼ 224 mm, voxel
size¼ 3 x 3 x 3 mm. To provide for equilibration effects, the first
three3 volumes were discarded. T1 -weighted structural images were
acquired at a resolution of 1 x 1 x 1 mm.
Image pre-processing
SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) was used for data analysis.
The EPI images were sinc interpolated in time for correction of slice
timing differences and realignment to the first scan by rigid body
transformations to correct for head movements. Field maps were esti-
mated from the phase difference between the images acquired at the
short and long TE and unwrapped, employing the FieldMap toolbox.
Field map and EPI imaging parameters were used to establish voxel
displacements in the EPI image. Application of the inverse displace-
ment to the EPI images served the correction of distortions. Utilising
linear and non-linear transformations, and smoothing with a Gaussian
kernel of full-width-half-maximum 8 mm EPI and structural images
were co-registered and normalized to the T1 standard template in
Montreal Neurological Institute space (International Consortium for
Brain Mapping). Global changes were removed by high-pass temporal
filtering with a cut-off of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts in
signal.
Statistical analysis
After pre-processing, statistical analysis was performed using the
General Linear Model. A first-level analysis was carried out to establish
each participant’s voxel-wise activation during ‘Advice Stage’ (i.e.
when the subject’s advice was accepted minus rejected) and the
‘Outcome Stage’ epochs (i.e. whether the advisee won or lost). Our
first-level regressors included the condition for Advice Stage as follows:
(i) accept, (ii) reject, (iii) accept both Advisors. For the Outcome
Stage, we modelled wins when (iv) Advisor A was accepted and win
outcome, (v) Advisor A was rejected and win outcome and (iv) both
Advisors A and B were accepted and win outcome. For the loss con-
ditions, (vi) Advisor A was accepted and loss outcome and (vii)
Advisor A was rejected and loss outcome and (ix) both A and B
accepted with loss outcome. The pre-programmed Advisee did not
reject both Advisors A and B, therefore no regressors for these con-
trasts were entered into the model. Further to these nine regressors
were six head-motion parameters defined by the realignment and
added to the model as regressors of no interest. Ninety trials were
presented with 15 in each Outcome Stage condition. Multiple linear
regression was then run to generate parameter estimates for each
regressor at every voxel. A second-level random effects analysis
(one-sample t-test) was performed to analyse data at a group level.
A family wise errorþ small volume correction (SVC) was used on a
priori regions of interest (ROIs 8 mm), including ventral striatum (Yu
et al., 2010) and MPFC (Izuma et al., 2010). These ROIs were chosen
based on the idea that the MPFC ROI used by Izuma et al. (2010)
would better reflect a region involved in self-monitoring or reputation
processing, while the ventral striatum ROI would reflect basic reward
processes. Activations are reported if they survive P< 0.05 SVC, with a
cluster size k> 30.
RESULTS
We tested two core hypotheses: (i) that it would be rewarding to have
one’s advice accepted and (ii) it will be rewarding to see the Advisee
win based on our (Advisor A’s) good advice compared with Advisor
B’s advice. With these two hypotheses in mind, our analysis focused on
examining neural activity during the Advice (Figure 1, highlighted in
red) and Outcome Stage (Figure 1, highlighted in purple) of each trial.
The rationale behind examining the Advice Stage was to see if subjects
found it rewarding to be accepted, while focusing on the Outcomes
Stage allowed us to examine whether outcomes based on one’s advice
will result in the recruitment of brain regions involved in self-referen-
tial processing, namely the MPFC. Analysis of the Outcome Stage was
based on the idea that acceptance or rejection of one’s advice would
modulate how people engage with the outcome of the Advisee’s
decision. For example, having one’s advice accepted should lead to
self-interest in the outcome.
Advice stage
Post-MRI scan questioning revealed that having the Advisee accept
one’s good advice was rewarding (Q3: mean 5.8 2.1). On the other
hand, how rewarding or how much they gloated when the Advisee lost
after rejecting their advice resulted in an average rating (Q1: 3.5 1.8).
A direct comparison between these two questions showed that it was
more rewarding to see the advisee win based on the subject’s advice
compared with seeing them lose after being rejected (t-test:
P< 0.0001). Furthermore, having the subject’s advice rejected by the
Advisee did not evoke strong negative feelings of rejection (Q2: mean
2.5 1.4). Given the low rating of how upset the subjects felt at being
rejected, we chose to report only findings for the Advice (when accepted
or not) and Outcome (accepted) Stages.
Advice accepted compared with rejected
For the Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) analysis, we
examined the Advice Stage or the time when the Advisee accepted or
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rejected the subject’s advice (Figure 1, highlighted in red). We observed
a main effect for the comparison of accepted minus rejected advice,
which, as hypothesized, showed increased activity within the
MPFC ([6, 62, 10], Z¼ 3.09, k¼ 141, P< 0.021 SVC; Figure 2A). We
found no significant activations associated with rejected minus
accepted advice.
Subject’s advice uniquely accepted compared with both
advisors’ advice accepted
A comparison of accepted Advisor A’s advice alone (and Advisor B’s
advice rejected) vs both Advisor A’s and Advisor B’s advice accepted
showed increased activity in the MPFC ([12 52 2], Z¼ 3.25, k¼ 109,
P< 0.009 SVC) and ventral striatum ([10 20 12], Z¼ 3.28, k¼ 143,
P< 0.008 SVC; Figure 2B). It is possible that the activity in these areas
reflected the anticipation of winning. Therefore, we examined whether
activity in the striatum and MPFC parametrically varied in accordance
with the probability of the Advisee winning (i.e. 60%, 70%, 80% and
90% chance of winning upon acceptance of advice). We found no
significant positive parametric modulation by probability in the
MPFC or striatum (P> 0.05). Of course, absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence, but this analysis certainly provides no further
support for the idea that anticipation of winning is the appropriate
explanation of the data.
Outcome stage
Post-MRI scan questionnaires were administered to assess how much
the subjects enjoy giving advice in everyday situations (Q5: mean
6.4 1.7) and feelings of personal responsibility for Advisee wins
(Q4: mean 4.6 2.0). Relating these individual differences on these
questions revealed that seeing the Advisee win after giving good
advice positively correlated with questionnaire measures relating to
how much people enjoy giving advice in everyday situations
(Pearson’s one-tailed test: r¼ .55, P¼ 0.004), and feelings of personal
responsibility for the Advisee’s subsequent wins (r¼ .61, P¼ 0.002).
Advisor A minus Advisor B advice leading to an Advisee win
For the fMRI data, we next examined the outcome conditions (obser-
ving the Advisee win; Figure 1, highlighted in purple) by comparing a
win based solely on the Advisee’s advice vs the Advisee taking advice
from Advisor B. Despite having an average (jittered) inter trial interval
(ITI) of 8 s between having one’s advice accepted and the winning
outcome, we wanted to ensure that this activity was not a direct func-
tion of the previous component of the trial. We therefore exclusively
masked the outcome neural activity with activity from the accepted
minus rejected advice contrast (Figure 2A). We found significant ac-
tivity in the striatum ([14, 8, 8], Z¼ 3.00, k¼ 170, P< 0.025 SVC)
and MPFC ([10, 54, 6], Z¼ 3.19, k¼ 121, P< 0.026 SVC), suggesting
that the rewarding outcome activity is distinct from the reward regions
Fig. 2 fMRI results. (A) Medial PFC (MPFC) activity associated with having advice accepted compared with rejected. (B) Medial PFC (MPFC) and striatal activity associated with having advice accepted compared
with when the Advisee accepted the subject (Advisor 1) and Advisor 2. (C) Activity associated with observing the Advisee win after having one’s advice accepted compared with rejected. (D) Neural activity when
the Advisee won money after accepting advice from the subject versus the subject plus Advisor B. (E) Activity for the Self loss/win minus Both loss/win comparison. All images are displayed at
P < 0.001uncorrected. Encircled areas reflect peak co-ordinates. MPFC¼medial prefrontal cortex; VS¼ ventral striatum. Both the MPFC and VS regions were SVC at P < 0.05 FWE with an 8 mm sphere
(Izuma et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010).
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associated with Acceptance. To further clarify the role of the MPFC, we
examined if the MPFC activation parametrically increased with the
probability of winning. We did not observe a significant increase in
MPFC activation supporting the notion that this region is not involved
in providing better advice.
Advisor A minus Advisor B advice leading to an Advisee lose
Similar to the win outcome, we found activity in the MPFC ([8, 54,
14], Z¼ 3.18, P< 0.015 SVC). For the opposite contrast (Advisor B
minus Advisor A, loss outcome), we found significant activity in the
caudate and visual cortex.
Advisor A minus (Advisor AþAdvisor B) advice leading to an
Advisee win
We next investigated the differences between seeing the Advisee win
outcome based on the subject’s (Advisor A’s) advice alone compared
with when the Advisee won based on correct advice from both
Advisors (Advisor A [Advisor AþAdvisor B]). We again found
significant activity in the MPFC ([12, 56, 12], Z¼ 3.16, k¼ 253,
P< 0.009 SVC; Figure 2D).
Advisor A minus (Advisor AþAdvisor B) advice accepted leading
to an Advisee lose
We also examined the neural activity associated with outcome loss
associated with Advisor A minus joint advice (the advisee accepting
both Advisor A and Advisor B and losing). We observed activity in the
MPFC, albeit at the liberal threshold of P< 0.0005uncorrected. For the
opposite contrast, we did not find any significant voxels.
Self loss/win minus both loss/win comparison
To examine the neural basis of self-relevant vs shared advice, we
conducted the analysis between Self loss/win minus Both loss/win
(Figure 2E). We again found increased activation in the MPFC
([12, 56, 0], Z¼ 2.70, k¼ 182, P< 0.046 SVC) supporting the idea
that the MPFC plays a role in self-relevant information.
DISCUSSION
Our results support the hypothesis that the MPFC is more active in
social situations that reflect exclusively on oneself. The MPFC was
active when the Advisee exclusively accepted the subject’s advice com-
pared with when the Advisee accepted the advice of the subject and a
second advisor (Advisor B), which fits with its role in self-monitoring,
including thinking about what others think of us (Amodio and Frith,
2006). Furthermore, we support the supposition that, under certain
conditions, having one’s advice accepted is socially rewarding. Post-
MRI scan questioning suggested that the amount of reward felt when
seeing the Advisee win positively correlated with the subjects’ procliv-
ity to give advice in everyday situations. Furthermore, having one’s
advice accepted results in activity in the brain’s reward circuitry.
One possibility, based on the additional recruitment of the striatum
for the acceptance of only Advisor A’s advice vs Advisor A and Advisor
B’s advice, is that it is more rewarding to have one’s advice accepted
alone than to share acceptance of advice with another (Advisor B).
The recruitment of the ventral striatum, however, was only observed
when the subject’s advice resulted in the Advisee winning and not
when the subjects shared the glory of seeing the Advisee win. This
suggests that it is more rewarding to see another win when we are
exclusively, rather than jointly, responsible for that win.
Our results lead to the intriguing question of whether or not it is
only gratifying to see an Advisee win when it reflects positively on one’s
self. Studies show that lack of anonymity influences subjects’
questionnaire responses in a direction of increasing social desirability
(Lautenschlager and Flaherty, 1990) and that people more readily
express their true feelings when they express their opinions through
the voice of a third party (Jonas et al., 2005). These observations reveal
that before speaking their true feelings, people bear in mind the nature
of an audience. Extending upon these observations, the same may hold
true in situations of advice giving, where the quality of advice given
may be seen as a direct or indirect reflection of the quality of the
person giving the advice. In support of this suggestion, increases in
MPFC and striatal activity were observed during watching the Advisee
win after accepting the subject’s advice in preference to Advisor B’s
advice. This leads to the conclusion that under certain conditions,
people may give advice for self-centred reasons, although the rather
controlled nature of the manipulated scenario might limit the degree
to which one can generalize these findings to more naturalistic scen-
arios and situations. Limitations aside, after having given good advice,
we feel most rewarded when we can exclusively, rather than jointly,
take credit for another’s success.
Further analysis suggests that the MPFC is also involved in process-
ing negative social outcomes that reflect directly on us. For example,
comparison between self-relevant win and loss outcomes minus shared
win and loss outcomes supports the hypothesis that the MPFC is
associated with self-relevant processes. The MPFC is known to be
involved in tasks that evoke self-relevance (Amodio and Frith, 2006).
These studies include metacognitive evaluations (Schmitz et al., 2004),
theory of mind or mentalizing (Fletcher et al., 1995) and trait evalu-
ation tasks (Kelley et al., 2002). Such processes would be critical to
processing the social consequence of one’s behaviour. It has previously
been shown that the MPFC becomes active when thinking about one’s
own reputation (Izuma et al., 2008), while the striatum activates
during value representations (Hare et al., 2008). The MPFC is also
evoked during positive evaluation by others (e.g. when someone
likes you; Davey et al., 2010) which may reflect meta-cognitive attri-
butions, such as thinking about what others think about us (Amodio
and Frith, 2006). In light of these findings, it is intriguing that
self-relevant social situations (Moran et al., 2006; Mobbs et al.,
2009a,b) and enhancements in self-esteem result in increases in
MPFC activity (Moran et al., 2006; Mobbs et al., 2009a,b; Somerville
et al., 2010). In the context of this study, we speculate that the MPFC
may form part of a reputation management network. For example, the
MPFC may detect socially relevant information, particularly when it
reflects directly on us. Future studies, however, should also try and
examine the overlap or the distinct MPFC regions that support
self-relevance, reputation and mentalizing.
We acknowledge several potential caveats to this study. For example,
the relationship between behavioural and neural data is sparse thereby
limiting our assumptions about the relationship between behaviour
and MPFC and striatal activity. Furthermore, we cannot be certain
that our findings only relate to positive feelings that are associated
with having one’s advice accepted and do not also encompass the
motivations behind giving advice. Although our findings indicate
that giving good advice may be one method by which we enhance
our reputation, other explanations do exist. For example, ego-inflation
or increases in self-esteem, and anticipated positive social feedback are
equally plausible explanations. Egotism, the high regard for oneself,
provides a salient mechanism by which advice giving results in self-
focus. Presumably, many of these alternative explanations are part and
parcel of processing self-relevant processes in the social context.
Navigating the social environment successfully depends on the im-
plementation of several operations including the ability to detect self-
relevant information and act in an appropriate manner. Our results
support the idea that the MPFC plays a key role in this process, while
the ventral striatum is active when self-relevant information is
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perceived to be positive (e.g. advice acceptance and reflected glory
Cialdina et al., 1976). More broadly, while advice giving often falls
under the rubric of altruism, the ‘egocentric’ perspective proposes
that giving advice affords us opportunities for reputation enhancement
by having others believe that we are knowledgeable, trustworthy, ben-
evolent and indispensible (Mayer et al., 1995; Sniezek and Buckley,
1995; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Helm and Salminen, 2010). This
leads to the intriguing speculation that while giving advice is often
relayed in the context of benevolent help, it may also serve more selfish
motivations such as increasing our value within a group, which in turn
minimizes the risk of social rejection.
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